



29th CTN Conference

University of Padua

21-22 May 2026

DAY 1 – THURSDAY, MAY 21

9:15 – 9:45 Registration (garden)

9:45 - 11:15 Parallel Sessions 1

* Session Chair

Cooperative Games I (Room 1th floor)

Juan Vidal-Puga *Universidade de Vigo*
Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining

Bas Dietzenbacher *Maastricht University*
Core selection with single-peaked preferences and endowment ownership

Agnieszka Rusinowska* *PSE – CNRS, University Paris 1*
Formation of international environmental agreements and pay-off allocation

11:15 - 11:30 Coffee Break (garden)

11:30 - 12:30

Keynote Lecture 1 (1th floor): Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley)

Compromise by Multimatum (chair: Antonio Nicolò)

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch (garden)

14:00 - 15:00 Parallel Sessions 2

Cooperative Games II (Room 1th floor)

Iwan Bos *Maastricht University*
Myopic Coalition Formation

Hideo Konishi* *Boston College*
Coalitional Stability in a Class of Social Interactions Games

15:00 - 15:20 Coffee Break (garden)

15:20 - 16:20 Parallel Sessions 3

Matching (Room 1th floor)

Pietro Salmaso *Università di Napoli Federico II*
Rationalizable Behavior in Matching with Externalities

Ana Mauleon* *UCLouvain, CORE/LIDAM*
School Choice with Unobservable Matchings

16:30 - 17:30

Keynote Lecture 2 (1th floor): Antonio Penta (ICREA, UPF and BSE)

Implementation via Transfers: Robustness, Uniqueness, and Belief Restrictions (chair: Riccardo Sautelle)

17:30 - 18:30 CTN Board Meeting (1th floor)

20:00 - Conference Dinner (Restaurant *Dante alle Piazze, via Menin 10, Padova*)

Bayesian Persuasion & Information Design (Room ground floor)

Yevgeny Tsoodikovich *Ben-Gurion University of the Negev*
Bayesian Persuasion in Large Networks

Anastas Tenev *Corvinus University of Budapest*
Partition and Persuade

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Ugo Bolletta* *Université Paris-Saclay*
Post-Truth

Matching & Assignment (Room ground floor)

Umutcan Salman *University of Padua*
The Revealed Preference Theory of Aggregate Object Allocations

Matteo Maria Triossi* *Ca' Foscari University of Venice*
Simple Strategies in Multi-unit Assignment Problems

Applications I (Room ground floor)

Berno Buechel *University of Fribourg*
Platform design and product quality

Sebastiano Della Lena* *Monash University*
How do you know you won't like it if you've never tried it?
Preference discovery and strategic bundling



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DAY 2 – FRIDAY, MAY 22

9:15 – 9:30 **Registration (garden)**

9:30 - 11:00 **Parallel Sessions 4**

*** Session Chair**

Networks I (Room 1th floor)

Andrew Harkins *University of Warwick*
Opinion Dynamics on Edges: Differentiated Messaging and Polarization

Mariya Teteryatnikova *Higher School of Economics*

Level-K Reasoning in Network Games With Strategic Complementarities

David Ryzák* *Czech Technical University in Prague*

A Tractable Class of Cooperative Games Defined by Directed Networks: Unanimity Decomposition and Shapley Value

11:00 - 11:15 **Break (garden)**

11:15 - 12:45 **Parallel Sessions 5**

Networks II (Room ground floor)

Christian Seel *Maastricht University*
Pairwise Stability in Random Networks

Manuel Staab *University of Queensland*
Cooperating on networks: inequality and social structure

Nizar Allouch* *University of Kent*
Aggregation and Stability in Networks

12:45 - 14:00 **Lunch (garden)**

14:00 - 15:00

Keynote Lecture 3 (1th floor): Anna Bogomolnaia (*University of Glasgow*)
(chair: Umutcan Salman)

15:00 - 16:30 **Parallel Sessions 6**

Cooperative Games III (Room 1th floor)

Amit Dekel *Aix-Marseille School of Economics*

Splitting a Pie Without Bargaining

Peter Bayer *Autonomous University of Barcelona*

Uncertain participation in coalitional games

Papatya Duman* *Bielefeld University*
Core Extensions with Hierarchical Coalitional Rationality

Social Choice & Fair Division (Room 117)

Anna Vakarova *UC Berkeley*
The Existence of Pareto Efficient and Envy Free random allocations in generalized settings

Toygar Kerman *Corvinus University of Budapest*

Nested Self-Selectivity

Grzegorz Kosiorowski* *Cracow University of Economics*

Relative Deprivation in Cooperative Games: Implications for the Shapley Value

Implementation (Room 1th floor)

Foivos Savva *University of Southampton*
Mutual support and the implementation of collective choices

Michele Lombardi *University of Liverpool*
Implementation in vNM stable set by rights structure

Giacomo Rubbini* *University of Bologna*
Mechanism Design with Opportunity Constraints

Applications II (Room ground floor)

Roberto Rozzi *Royal Holloway University of London*
The Evolution of Consumer Naivete in a Market with Network Externalities

Bozhong Zheng *Tsinghua University [Beijing]*
Seeking Profits or Rents, the Role of Signed Network

Hao Yu* *University of Glasgow*
On click-fraud under pro-rata revenue sharing rule